Post Ayatollah Khamenei scenarios in Iran

by: Dr Fariborz Saremi, Strategic Analyst

Sept 4th2023

After months of extensive research and numerous exchanges of thoughts with policymakers and think tanks in the US and Germany, I can confidently assert that there exist several scenarios and potential political outcomes regarding the phase that will follow the tenure of Iran’s current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. The post-Khamenei scenarios may be outlined as follows:

1-Peaceful Power Transfer:

This scenario envisions a seamless transfer of power with the announcement of a new Supreme Leader. According to this scenario, the Assembly of Experts would convene an emergency meeting to select a successor to Khamenei. It is presumed that this process would unfold with the support of the country’s powerful institutions and without any extraordinary events or riots that might lead to deviations from the constitution. This scenario hinges on the assumption that the normal situation remains unchanged, and the constitution is adhered to when appointing a new Supreme Leader for any reason.

2-Supreme Leader Designating a Successor:

This scenario assumes that the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has already designated his successor. In this case, the Assembly of Experts would gather to declare the new Supreme Leader. However, this scenario implies certain challenges, e.g. if powerful institutions within the Iranian establishment, such as the IRGC, attempt to influence the choice by imposing a specific candidate after their mood has shifted. Despite this, the Assembly of Experts might opt to fulfill its constitutional duties in selecting the new Supreme Leader independently, disregarding Khamenei’s will or by bowing to IRGC pressure. In essence, if events proceed normally, this scenario closely resembles the first one.

3-Military Coup:

In the event of an inability to perform duties, death, resignation, or dismissal of Khamenei, there could be a scenario where millions of Iranians take to the streets to demand an end to the Wilayate Fagih and the establishment of a new political system. This uprising would be fueled by popular anger at the policies of the ruling elite, as demonstrated through civil disobedience and strikes that have recently shaken Iran. Iranians, especially the young one, have an adamant desire to bring down the political system. Should this scenario come to pass, and the IRGC perceives the system as on the brink of collapse, it might stage a military coup to seize power. Former Minister of Defense Hossein Dehghan has hinted at the possibility of Army officers staging a military coup in such circumstances.

It’s worth noting that there are three main opposition movements outside Iran that aspire to gain power in the event of internal revolt, though these movements suffer from inefficiency, disunity, and a lack of organization:

a) Prince Reza Pahlavi: The son of the late Shah of Iran, toppled in 1979, has some supporters inside and outside Iran. However, the movement is characterized by disorganization, multiple splinter groups, and a lack of democratic processes. Intellectuals within Iran do not widely support this movement.

b ) MEK (MKO): This organization is well-organized but consists of aging members and is generally disliked in Iran.

c) Socialists and the Left: Although internally divided, this faction possesses good thinkers and analysts, and maintains contact with some reformists inside Iran. Nevertheless, it lacks a strong support base and effective leadership.

Some factions of monarchists and the MEK have been supported in the last few years by the Israel Lobby but not by the west.

If the IRGC were to stage a military coup to seize power, it would lack any political or intellectual ideology beyond the religious ideals it has upheld since the 1979 Iranian revolution. However, in the event that the Islamic Republic transforms into a traditional military dictatorship akin to Pakistan, this new dictatorial structure would likely face resistance from all segments of Iranian society. Additionally, conflict could emerge between the IRGC and the Iranian Army, which may reject exclusive IRGC control over power.

Regarding potential successors to Khamenei:

1) Ebrahim Raisi: The current President of the IRI is considered one of the major candidates to succeed Khamenei. While not holding the rank of a mujtahid, the conservative faction of the IRI has referred to him as Ayatollah since his appointment as head of the judiciary. Raisi has a strong relationship with the IRGC and has a history of an “iron-fist” crackdown on labor activists and trade unionists during his tenure as head of the judiciary. It is also said that he adopted a hard line against the system opponents with the aim of presenting himself to the supreme leader and the IRGC as the best candidate to serve as the savior in the next phase. Raisi wanted to prove to the ruling elite that he is following in the footsteps of the Iranian revolution’s founding fathers and has never deviated from their line. Raisi is an ultra conservative belonging to the school of Misbah Yazdi, who was a radical cleric supportive of Wilayat Fagih. He is viewed as aligning with the principles of Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1979 revolution, which is important for preserving the revolutionary atmosphere within the Iranian political system.

2) Mujtaba Khamenei, son of Ayatollah Khamenei: Among the major candidates, Mujtaba is a notable figure. Khamenei’s long tenure in office has allowed his son Mujtaba to build strong relationships with the intelligence and security services of the IRI. Mujtaba presents himself as a politically and religiously qualified jurist, backed by his father’s considerable influence. He has also studied at the feet of Misbah Yazdi. Strikingly, he has not achieved the rank of Ayatollah, but Mujtaba holds positions in various secret agencies and oversees the office of the Supreme Leader, which has significantly expanded. Due to the strong relationship with his father, some Iranian observers speculate that he could be the most powerful and likely candidate to succeed his father, as Khamenei may prefer to hand over power to a bloodline successor who would continue his legacy.