Why Iran is hard to intimidate

The Economist-Feb 6th2024

Deterrence is a simple concept: using the threat of force to stop an enemy from doing something. On paper, America should have no trouble restraining Iran thus. The former has a globe-striding army; the latter still relies on warships and fighter jets that predate the Moon landing. In practice, though, Iran has proved devilishly difficult to deter. It is hard to put off insurgents and militias through air campaigns; their goals are attrition and survival, not well-ordered governance, and they are willing to sustain casualties. Full-scale invasion is the only real way to deter them and the history of such interventions is salutary.

Since October the Islamic Republic’s proxy militias in Syria and Iraq have carried out more than 160 attacks on American troops. Some were harmless—more theatre than threat—but not the one on January 28th, which killed three American soldiers at a base in north-eastern Jordan. The Houthis, meanwhile, an Iranian-backed militia in Yemen, have formonths waged a campaign of missile and drone attacks against commercial ships in the Red Sea, choking off a waterway that handles perhaps 30% of global container trade.

Since October the Islamic Republic’s proxy militias in Syria and Iraq have carried out more than 160 attacks on American troops. Some were harmless—more theatre than threat—but not the one on January 28th, which killed three American soldiers at a base in north-eastern Jordan. The Houthis, meanwhile, an Iranian-backed militia in Yemen, have for months waged a campaign of missile and drone attacks against commercial ships in the Red Sea, choking off a waterway that handles perhaps 30% of global container trade.

America has begun to hit back. On February 3rd it bombed more than 85 targets in western Iraq and eastern Syria, the first round of what Joe Biden, the American president, promised would be a multi-stage response to the drone attack in Jordan. It struck the Houthis the next day and again on February 5th, part of a campaign against the group that has so far lasted a month. Yet the attacks from Iranian-backed militias continue, even after the strikes ostensibly meant to deter them.

Mr Biden’s hawkish critics think they know why: American threats are not credible because America is unwilling to strike Iran itself. “The Biden administration can take out all the Iranian proxies they like, but it will not deter Iranian aggression,” said Lindsey Graham, a Republican senator from South Carolina. Instead they call for direct attacks on Iranian territory; they point to the example of Operation Praying Mantis, during the “tanker wars” of the 1980s, in which America sank five of Iran’s warships and destroyed two of its oil platforms in the Persian Gulf.

Critics on the left make a different argument. They see talk of deterrence as misguided warmongering and instead offer what they say is a simple solution: end the war in Gaza. If Israel stops killing Palestinians, Iranian-backed militias might stop their own violent acts.

Both arguments miss the mark. It is true that hitting Iran’s navy in 1988 compelled it to reduce its attacks on oil tankers (and stop targeting Americans altogether). But the Iran of 1988 was exhausted from a ruinous eight-year war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and bereft of strong allies. It had no choice but to back down. The Iran of today, by contrast, has a powerful network of proxies and some degree of support from both Russia and China. A round of American strikes might make it even more inclined to use those proxies—and, perhaps, to dash for a nuclear bomb as insurance against future attacks.