Iran Has Every Reason Now to Go Nuclear

Foreign Policy-Oct24th2024

By Ellie Geranmayeh, the deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

The recent conflicts in the Middle East have ignited open debate among Iran’s political elite over whether the country should weaponize its vast nuclear program. The rationale for doing so, from Iranian leadership’s perspective, appears more convincing than ever.

Above all, Iran needs to reestablish deterrence equilibrium with its longtime foes Israel and the United States. Traditionally, to deter its adversaries from attacking or implementing regime change, Tehran relied on a three-pronged approach focused on missiles, militias, and a nuclear program.

To offset its weak air force, Iran invested heavily in its missiles program, making its arsenal one of the most advanced in the region. Iran also anchors its asymmetric warfare strategy through the so-called “forward defense” policy of using militarized nonstate actors to encircle Israel and the U.S. regional military presence and to mobilize these forces to attack if required. Iran has cultivated its relations with groups that are hostile to the United States and Israel, building the so-called Axis of Resistance, providing them with arms—including sophisticated missiles and drones—as well as training and financial support.

However, Iran’s missiles capabilities and the Axis of Resistance have taken a hit in recent months. The Israeli onslaught against Iran’s most trusted partner, Hezbollah in Lebanon, has delivered a blow to its arsenal, fighters, and command and control structure. Iran was left humiliated by Israel’s ability to assassinate Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh while he was in Tehran this summer. Following the killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar this month, Israel seems determined to keep upping the ante to establish a new regional order.

Although Hamas and Hezbollah will continue to undermine Israeli security, the ability of these groups to mobilize in defense of Iran seems severely diminished while they fight for their own survival. Meanwhile, the United States has doubled down on its efforts to shield Israel, moving new anti-missile systems into the country, together with American troops to operate them, in a bid to defang future attacks from Iran and its allies.

Perhaps Iran’s biggest Achilles’s heel is its self-restraint. Over the past year, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has repeatedly held back from a direct war with Israel and the United States. He has also shied away from triggering a full assault by the Axis of Resistance front. Israel has interpreted this restraint as a weakness and exploited it.

This shift in regional deterrence has strengthened the argument in Tehran favoring a nuclear umbrella. Iran has already obtained nuclear threshold status, placing it at the tipping point of weaponization. Iran can develop enough material for a nuclear bomb in just over a week, with some experts assessing that it could build a nuclear warhead to carry these bombs within several months. In the same way that India and Pakistan achieved a relative cold peace, Tehran may look to check Israeli behavior through rebalancing the nuclear playing field.

Another argument for why Iran could dash for the bomb is that the country has already paid the high cost of becoming a nuclear weapons state without receiving the perceived benefits of having the bomb.

Ever since the Trump administration withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal, which Iran was in full compliance with at the time, the United States has imposed its largest-scale sanctions to date against Iran. Western relations with Tehran further plummeted over Iran’s abysmal human rights record, its regional posture, and military assistance to Russia during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Given the anti-Iran sentiment across Western capitals, the Iranian leadership would be correct to conclude that major U.S. sanctions relief of the type seen in 2015 is not on the horizon. If Iran is already being treated as a nuclear pariah state by the West, then why not secure the perceived security benefits of going nuclear?

Finally, the broader geopolitical conditions today mean the costs associated with Iran becoming a nuclear state are lower than a decade ago. Tensions between world powers now make it increasingly unlikely that Russia, and possibly China, will stand in Iran’s way. Tehran can also capitalize on the Ukraine war by pushing to trade its military equipment—which Moscow desperately needs—for Russian nuclear know-how, technology, and defense at the U.N. Security Council. The United States already fears this could be happening.

Against this backdrop, those inside Iran favoring nuclear weaponization likely see two choices ahead: either Iran’s nuclear facilities are eventually destroyed by Israel and the United States first, and then Tehran stumbles toward nuclear weapons over a longer timeframe with depleted resources, or Iran starts the weaponization now while it has advanced nuclear capabilities and Israel is bogged down in Gaza and Lebanon. Iranian strategists may be swayed for the latter option when faced with a weakened Axis of Resistance, a formidable Israeli-U.S. military force and an Israel poised to strike at Iranian nuclear sites. Despite the strong likelihood that the country will be bombed throughout this process by Israel and the United States, Iran’s leadership may conclude it can bear the brunt of military action and come out of it stronger.

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