Iran’s Divided Opposition

FORIGN AFFAIRS –

Sanam Vakil and Alex Vatanka

February 13, 2026

henever Iran is shaken by nationwide protests, as it was just last month, analysts and activists are consumed by the same two questions: Will the country’s regime finally fall, and what will come next if it does? Answers abound. Some analysts think that the country’s leadership is surprisingly secure and that the regime can withstand more demonstrations. Some believe it will collapse, only to be followed by another dictatorship under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the most politically powerful branch of the country’s armed forces. Others are more optimistic, arguing that the entire system will go down and that an external opposition figure, perhaps the former Iranian crown prince Reza Pahlavi, will help the country transition to a democratic government or that Pahlavi will set up a constitutional monarchy. Those more optimistic still think that Iran might have a negotiated transition toward democracy, with regime figures offloading power to opposition ones.

Iran does seem poised on the brink of great change. The regime is exhausted, and Iranians are infuriated by decades of economic mismanagement. Its supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, is an 86-year-old cancer survivor. If upcoming talks in Oman between Tehran and Washington fail to break the nuclear impasse and address Iran’s other destabilizing activities, the Trump administration might also resort to attacking the country. But current speculation about Iran’s day after (including among U.S. officials debating what course of action to take) glosses over the factor that will determine whether Iranians will have a better future: the state of the country’s opposition movement. That movement, unfortunately, is deeply fractured. Its members are divided into many factions—college students, ethnic minorities, diasporic monarchists, to name just a few—that are frequently at odds. For example, opposition activists routinely accuse one another of secretly collaborating with the Iranian regime or with foreign governments. As a result of this fractiousness, they have struggled to capitalize on the Islamic Republic’s weakness.

If they want to take down the regime, Iran’s opposition groups must learn to work together. They need to adopt a basic, shared program that rests on principles everyone agrees on and postpone debates on everything else. They must come up with a plan to manage the country in the immediate aftermath of the regime’s collapse. Finally, they must be more inclusive, rather than constantly trying to freeze one another out. Otherwise, the Islamic Republic will persist not because it commands popular support but because there is no alternative.

NO LOVE LOST

Unlike some authoritarian states, such as Belarus or Venezuela, Iran’s opposition does not have a unifying infrastructure or a clear leader. Instead, it is best thought of as an archipelago of political islands divided by geography, generation, ideology, and exposure to repression. These groups include neighborhood associations, student cells, women’s rights circles, ethnic movements, and labor organizations. They have all participated in the waves of protests that have rocked Iran since 2009. But between intense state repression and reciprocal mistrust, they have struggled to coordinate their actions.

Consider, for example, the country’s labor groups. These organizations, made up of teachers, pensioners, transportation employees, and other kinds of workers, represent perhaps the most structured oppositional force in the country. They routinely articulate Iranians’ grievances about inflation, inequality, corruption, privatization, and other economic issues. These groups also share most Iranians’ anger over the ideological, aggressive, and militant foreign policy that the regime has pursued for decades, which has led to Iran’s isolation and impoverishment. And they have deep roots in Iran’s working and lower-middle classes. But the government has limited their activities and prevented them from coordinating with student groups and women’s groups, and with human rights councils.

Iran also has opposition networks composed of ethnic minorities—including Kurdish, Baluchi, Ahwazi Arab, and Azerbaijani groups—that have substantial organizational capacity. Their leaders call for not only the end of clerical rule but also the recognition of minority linguistic and cultural rights, the decentralization of power, and meaningful autonomy. But these organizations are usually wary of partnering. The former fear that the latter will replace the Islamic Republic with another Persian-dominated, exclusive, and centralized government, whereas and the latter fear that the former will empower secessionist movements or invite foreign meddling along Iran’s porous and conflict-prone borders.