October Nuclear Surprise

By Dr. Mehran Mostafavi 

The negotiations between the Islamic Republic and the United States, mediated by Oman, and the high-level diplomatic exchanges between Iran and other countries, have once again raised the question for many people: Will there be any limited agreement with the United States or not? And if the answer is yes, will this agreement be beneficial? By a limited agreement, we mean any possible agreement between Iran and the United States that would reduce the current tensions. As we know, the JCPOA is no longer in effect as the sunset of the JCPOA is approaching. On the other hand, it is not possible to reach any new agreement between the Islamic Republic and the United States because a new agreement requires approval from the US Congress, which is currently not feasible. Therefore, the only remaining solution is an unwritten and undisclosed understanding or agreement that does not require congressional approval. It is essentially a mutual promise to implement a series of actions that the officials of both Iran and the United States make to each other. In this article, I will address why such an unwritten understanding with a regime that is not on a direct path and has shown in the past quarter-century that it uses nuclear policy solely as a tool for its own consolidation can have a high political cost. I would like to draw attention to the matter related to the American side, and I will leave what pertains to the Iranian people for another time.

Before anything else, let me explain what October Surprise means. Since the US presidential elections are held in November, October Surprise refers to an unexpected event that occurs in October and creates a surprise, causing the public to reconsider their decisions, and someone who has a high approval rating may lose their votes due to a specific event in October. This has happened several times in the United States. However, the most significant one is related to the 1980 US elections when Reagan was a presidential candidate and struck a deal with the ruling clergy in Iran to keep the hostages until after the elections. If Carter, who was ahead of Reagan in public opinion polls, had succeeded in freeing the hostages before the presidential elections, he would undoubtedly have been reelected as President. However, Beheshti, Rafsanjani, and Khamenei conspired to delay the release of the hostages to secure their interests and empower Reagan. They used the hostages as leverage against their opponents; they wanted to eliminate Bani Sadr, weaken the army, and strengthen the Revolutionary Guards. All of these events happened, and Reagan, after coming to power, provided weapons to Iran. Interestingly, one of the members of Bani Sadr’s presidential office, Mr. Rashid Sadral-Hefazi, was executed on charges of “plotting against Beheshti” after the June coup in 1981 against President Banisadr. He had no crime other than collecting information about the deal, but his regime ruthlessly executed him.

Now the significant issue here is that the United States has entered the stage of the presidential elections, and it is still unclear who the presidential candidates will be. Nothing is certain yet about Biden or Trump. The former due to his physical condition, and the latter due to serious allegations that have been made against him may not be able to make it to the end, and even other candidates from the two parties may emerge. Although there is a chance that these two individuals will compete against each other again, it is still too early to be certain about it, although this issue will not change anything regarding the subject of this article.

Biden needs a winning card regarding Iran’s nuclear policy to be elected. He blames Trump for the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which led the Islamic Republic to increase its uranium enrichment to 60%. Biden intends to demonstrate, through an unwritten agreement with Iran, that he has been successful in standing against Iran’s nuclear ambitions and preventing them from developing and possessing a nuclear bomb. To achieve this, Iran should not only refrain from enriching uranium above 60% in the next 18 months, but also abandon 60% enrichment and reduce its enriched uranium reserves to the lowest possible level. Currently, the breakout time for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb is only a few weeks away from becoming a few months. In return, the United States should offer privileges to Iran, such as releasing Iran’s financial resources in other countries, which Iran desperately needs, and allowing oil sales, which Iran is currently benefiting from due to the non-implementation of the oil embargo. Additionally, the release of American political prisoners held in Iran could help Biden during the elections.

However, what is overlooked is the winning card that the Islamic Republic still holds, which Khamenei can easily use to interfere in the US elections. For example, if the leadership of the Islamic Republic sees it in their interest to defeat Biden in the presidential election, they can create a sudden increase in enrichment levels before the elections, which would surprise Biden. This action would portray Biden as a weak individual who failed to make significant progress even with the release of some Iranian assets, weakening his position in public opinion. Such a move could potentially benefit Trump or any other candidate who takes a tougher stance against Iran.

Therefore, any limited agreement or understanding between Iran and the United States, regardless of its form or nature, could have significant political implications. It is crucial to consider the long-term consequences of such agreements and analyze the intentions and motives of both parties involved. The article concludes that entering into any unwritten agreement without proper scrutiny and addressing the fundamental issues in the US-Iran relationship may impose high political costs on Iran, especially considering Iran’s history of using nuclear policies to strengthen its own regime.

It remains to be seen if the Democrats are concerned about this issue and whether they are acting cautiously with Iran. The developments in the coming months will shed light on this matter.

About The Author: Mehran Mostafavi Professor at Paris Saclay University, who has been observing the Islamic Republic’s nuclear policy for 20 years. He has written dozens of articles in Persian on the subject.