The fall of Bashar al-Assad is a blow to Iran

The Economist-Dec12,2024

FROM THE assault on America’s embassy during the Iranian revolution in 1979 to the sacking of the Saudi embassy in 2016, storming diplomatic missions used to be something Iranians did to others. These days it happens to Iran itself. Such was their hatred of Iran’s rulers that after they had smashed up the palace of Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s fallen dictator, in Damascus this week, Syrian rebels moved on to the embassy of Iran, his prime backer. Back in Iran, many malcontents greeted scenes of the Islamic Republic’s forces fleeing from the rebels with a joy approaching that of Syria’s newly liberated people. “People are very happy and hope our regime will be next,” says a university lecturer in Tehran.

After the routing by Israel of Hamas and Hizbullah, its two main proxies in the region, the fall of Mr Assad, its third, is a further sign of Iran’s waning influence. Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, likes to say that his country is nearing its ghaleh, or zenith. But he must wonder whether it is already behind him

Iran has been diminished gradually, then suddenly. Back in 2015, it had signed a nuclear deal with the United States and enjoyed broad regional reach. Since then, it has wobbled. In 2018 President Donald Trump tightened sanctions, which sent the economy spiralling downwards. In 2020, America assassinated Qassem Suleimani, Iran’s top general, in Iraq. Iran tried but failed to avoid being dragged into Israel’s war with Hamas following the group’s attack on Israel on October 7th 2023. Just over a year later, its three regional proxies have been destroyed.

In terms of territory, Mr Assad’s fall is the biggest setback to date. In less than a week Iran’s forward positions have moved from the Mediterranean to Iraq’s western border, 300 miles closer to Iran. It is evacuating the last of around 4,500 nationals from Syria. Not one fighter remains, says an Iranian official. Gone is the land corridor to Israel’s border. Regional rivals, Turkey, Israel and Arab powers, are filling the vacuum. No wonder Mr Khamenei claimed, in a televised address on December 11th, that events in Syria were the result of a plot by Israel and America.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is trying to put a brave face on the collapse of an alliance that dates back to the dawn of Iran’s revolution. Mr Assad, say its generals, had grown increasingly unreliable and duplicitous as he floundered for allies to save him. Iran and Hizbullah had sent their forces to save him from an earlier uprising in 2013, but he did nothing to reciprocate when Israel attacked their positions in Syria, killing 19 Iranian commanders over the past year. Some suspected him of collusion with Israel.

Bereft of three satellites, the IRGC is recalibrating its defence policy, even as Israel and America hone their plans for possible strikes on Iran’s nuclear and military installations. Its proxies had already begun to turn from an asset into a liability. By opening fronts against Israel, Hamas and Hizbullah dragged Iran into a direct confrontation that it had sought to avoid.