What to do with Iran’s nuclear program?

A snapshot

By Dr. Behrooz Bayat
July 28, 2024
The more time passes, the more confused, complex and threatening the situation of
The Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program becomes.
The Trump administration's reckless withdrawal in May 2018 from the nuclear
Agreement concluded three years earlier between the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)
And the P5+1 consisting of the USA, Great Britain, France, China, Russia and
Germany, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was seen by the
IRI, in particular by its supreme leader Ali Khamenei, as a welcome opportunity to
reactivate the nuclear program for the purpose for which it was originally intended -
namely deterrence - and to push it forward with all its power.
But the EU and US administrations have not taken their JCPOA commitments
seriously either: within the US, the JCPOA was an issue of contention in the
fundamental dispute between the Republicans and the Democrats from the very
beginning, and the Europeans have been unable to demonstrate an independent,
self-confident policy.

Mirroring this, a battle had broken out in Iran between two wings of the Iranian
regime, namely between the fundamentalist hardliners under Khamenei and the
more realpolitik-oriented Islamists under the then President Hassan Rouhani, who
wanted to facilitate an economic opening towards the West while maintaining
despotic rule.
Ultimately, the extremists prevailed on both sides: the Trump-Netanyahu and Ali
Khamenei team, leaning on its Russian ally, virtually blew up the nuclear agreement.
Deterrence revitalized and nuclear doctrine updated
The IRI has apparently now decided to use its nuclear program (NP) beyond
deterrence as a means of extorting concessions and blackmailing. Therefore, in
addition to pushing Uranium enrichment generally, it has accumulated those
quantities of Uranium with 60% U235 that cannot be understood as anything other
than a demonstrative step towards the production of a nuclear warhead.
As if this were not enough, former regime dignitaries such as Kamal Kharrazi and Ali
Akbar Salehi, both former foreign ministers and the latter also the head of the IRI
Atomic Energy Agency, rushed to announce that the regime had the capability to
build a nuclear bomb - but it did not want to build it.
This threatening attitude was later backed up with the statement that the regime
was considering rethinking its nuclear doctrine. Previously, the denial of the regime
to have intentions to make the bomb was justified by the alleged supreme leader Ali
Khamenei’s Fatwa - i.e. a religious verdict- which had declared the production and
use of the nuclear bomb to be "un-Islamic" and forbidden.

Hesitation by the West, encouragement of the IRI regime
The consequence is that the IRI has thrown all technical barriers to its NP
overboard, so that its distance to a nuclear warhead is getting continuously shorter.
However, this does not mean that the regime will soon be able to build and use the
bomb. Enough 90%-enriched uranium does not make a bomb.
The JCPOA was designed in such a way that the "break-out time", i.e. the time
required from the decision to produce 90%-enriched uranium sufficient for a bomb,
was at least one year. The fact is, however, that this "break-out time" has now
shrunk to a few weeks.
In the complex global political situation, in which the West and the USA are
preoccupied with the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine, the Israeli army's
devastating war in Gaza, the containment of the People's Republic of China and the
migration problem, these powers have no interest in the emergence of a new trouble
spot in the Middle East, let alone any desire for war with Iran - and that is gratifying,
as a war in Iran would be an absolute disaster.
This behavior of the West is based on the fact that the European powers and the
USA seem to have learned from recent history that a war in the Middle East cannot
be won or kept under control, and that a renewed upheaval in this region would lead
to streams of war refugees that could endanger almost all of Europe's democracies.
Aware of this, Khamenei believes he can ignore the demands of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) without fear of serious reprisals. Non-compliance with
IAEA demands has augmented gradually in recent years. A situation has now been
reached in which both the IAEA and the West and the USA have been forced into
action.
Aware of these circumstances, Khamenei believes he can ignore the demands of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) without fear of serious reprisals. Non-
compliance with IAEA demands has increased gradually in recent years. A situation
has now been reached in which both the IAEA and the West and the USA have been
forced into action.
Rafael Grossi's concern

The statements made by Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, are an
expression of this muddled situation. Recently, a certain insecurity has been
perceptible in his statements, indicating his concern about an imminent control
losing above the IRI nuclear program. He is increasingly using less diplomatic
language, in which he also used the analogy for the first time that the IRI could go
the path of North Korea. He was therefore very keen to remain in touch with Tehran.
He hopes to gain concessions from the Islamic regime and restore its nuclear
transparency. He made several trips to Tehran, during which he succeeded in
obtaining vague assurances, albeit assurances that remained largely inconsequential.

The IAEA's objections with regard to the verification of IRI's compliance
with its commitments under the Vienna nuclear deal JCPOA
- The report notes that the limits on overall nuclear activities committed by Iran in
framework of the JCPOA have been far exceeded:
- There are 62 centrifuge cascades of various level of advancement in operation, e.g.
IR-1 to IR-6, while Approximately 5,000 IR-1 centrifuges are permitted.
- The amount of enriched uranium accumulated is 5841.3 kg UF6, of which 751.3 kg
with 20% and 142.1 kg with 60% enrichment - Permitted are 300 kg UF6 with
3.67% enrichment grade.
- Interruption and impairment of the technical monitoring of the NP, i.e. the removal
of all cameras and in-line sensors for detecting the quantity and grade of
enrichment. As a result, the IAEA has lost in particular a comprehensive overview of
centrifuge parts manufactured, heavy water produced and uranium mining for the
past three years.
- The IAEA concludes that the obstacles in the way of supervision and monitoring of
IRI's nuclear activities have serious implications that prevent the IAEA from
guaranteeing that Iran's NP is exclusively of a peaceful nature.
- The IAEA Director General notes that the IRI has suspended provisional application
of the Additional Protocol to the NPT for three years. Since then, the IAEA has had
no complementary access to nuclear facilities and other sites undeclared sites.
- The Director General deeply regrets that Iran has not reversed its decision to
refuse experienced IAEA inspectors from certain countries. He reiterates that without
the experienced inspectors, effective verification of IRI activities cannot be
guaranteed.

Resolution of the BoG

The E3 (Germany, France, UK) submitted a draft resolution, which was controversial
between the USA and E3 in the run-up to the board meeting. It was presented in a
somewhat softened form and adopted on June 5, 2024 with 20 votes in favor, 2
against and 12 abstentions. The resolution incorporated all the IAEA's demands,
findings and complaints regarding the IRI's deviations described above and called on
the IRI to comply with them urgently. In parallel, the E3 sent a letter to the UN
Security Council in which they listed Tehran's shortcomings from their point of view.
On the other hand, seven members of the IAEA (Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela,
Nicaragua, Cuba and Syria) issued a statement blaming the West and the US
withdrawal from the JCPOA for the conflict. On June 5, 2023, the IAEA Board of
Governors adopted a resolution instructing Tehran to urgently comply with IAEA
demands
IRI response to the resolution: Tehran's reaction to the resolution was prompt:
it again responded by stepping up enrichment. Tehran has decided to install eight

cascades of the advanced IR-6 centrifuges in the most sensitive location of Iran's
nuclear facilities, in particular i facilities buried in the mountains in Fordo, as well as
18 IR-2 centrifuges in Natanz.
In my opinion, however, the response of the IRI does not represent a qualitative
change in the IRI's nuclear policy. The regime can produce enough 90% enriched
uranium for several nuclear bombs within weeks anyway. The use of new centrifuges
increases the number of potential nuclear warheads.
Following this announcement from Tehran, the E3 issued a statement saying that the
JCPOA was about to become an empty shell. This expression could be interpreted as
a hint to activate the snap-back mechanism.
Assessment of the BoG resolution
It sanctioned all of Director General Grossi's demands. However, the wording of the
provisions of the resolution does not go beyond the two previous resolutions. One
key provision that would have represented a qualitative departure from the previous
ones would have been an explicit request to the IAEA to produce a comprehensive
report on the status of the IRI NP - the example was the report by former IAEA
Director General Yukyia Amano in 2011, which intensified the pressure on the IRI
regime to such an extent that it ultimately agreed to an agreement such as the
JCPOA. But the wording for this provision is soft; it is only a "May" provision.
It was known that in the run-up to the BoG meeting there were differences about
the pros and cons of submitting a resolution between the E3 and the US. In the end,
the E3 prevailed.
In my view, the reasons for these differences could be the following:
- Because of a lack on sanctioning means, a resolution like the previous one remains
largely inconsequential and therefore symbolic. A BoG resolution is normally only
effective if the BoG refers the case to the United Nations Security Council.
In the current constellation, a decision to the detriment of the IRI regime is
unthinkable because the animosities that have arisen between Russia and China on
the one hand and the USA and Europe on the other would thwart any resolution
initiated by the West with their veto power.
- It could provide the regime with a pretext to push its NP one step further in the
direction of military application - as has happened so far.
- In view of the highly tense situation in the Middle East and in view of the
devastating war in Gaza instigated by Hamas and escalated far out of proportion by
Netanyahu, the Biden administration does not want to further aggravate the
situation and provoke the IRI regime.
- However, in addition to maintaining pressure on the Islamic regime in Teheran, the
purpose of the E3 initiative could also be that they do not want to let go of the
"snap-back" mechanism provided for in the JCPOA and sanctioned by UN Security

Council Resolution 2231. According to this mechanism, any JCPOA signatory can
raise its dissatisfaction with the other side and, following a defined procedure, refer
the case to the UN Security Council if the disagreement persists.
The JCPOA and UN Security Council Resolution 2231 did not lift the sanctions
imposed on the IRI, but only suspended them, so that the Council can decide each
time on the recommendation of the JCPOA parties whether to continue the
suspension. If there is no unanimity, the suspension can be ended and all globally
valid UN sanctions imposed on Iran prior to the conclusion of the JCPOA could be
reactivated. In this case, the veto power works exclusively in favor of the Western
countries.
- Security Council Resolution 2231 stipulates that after 10 years, unless otherwise
negotiated, the UN sanctions would be lifted. The resolution initiated by the E3 can
therefore be perceived as a propagandistic and psychological preparation for the
possible activation of the snap-back mechanism.
Conclusion
With or without the bomb, the Islamic regime will not give up its nuclear aspiration.
On the other hand, the West has repeatedly declared that it will not tolerate an IRI
with nuclear weapons. Israel fears that its nuclear hegemony in the region would be
weakened and would want to prevent this with all its instruments. The adjacent
states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey could strive to restore the than
distorted nuclear balance.
In short: the entire system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) could
collapse.
The victims are the Iranian citizens, who have become hostages of a misguided
nuclear policy of a despotic regime. It gives rise to serious concerns that not only
the devastating economic losses will continue, but that the country will also be
plunged into a ruinous war.♦


About the author: Dr. Behrooz Bayat, born in Iran, studied physics at the universities
of Tehran, Frankfurt am Main and Marburg. After completing his doctorate and
research and teaching , he worked in the industry as a freelance consultant for the
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. His publications deal with Iran's
nuclear policy, among other things. Dr. Bayat is currently senior fellow at the Center
for Middle East and Global Order.